US Deficit Regression Trend Lines
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The same regression trend lines as the S&P 500 page, applied to the federal budget from the overspending side. Data: OMB Historical Table 1.1, fiscal years 1901–2025, nominal dollars. Fiscal years ended June 30 through 1976 and September 30 since 1977.
- Cumulative deficit (default): every deficit since 1789 added up, minus surpluses. It's a stock of borrowing that, like the index, compounds over time. It approximates debt held by the public ($27.5T at FY2025).
- Annual deficit: outlays minus receipts each year. It turns negative in surplus years, so only the Linear fit applies.
- Outlays / Receipts: total federal spending and revenue each year.
- Interest (% of GDP) / Interest payments: two measures, chosen with Interest measure:
- Total deficit × Fed rate (default): the prior fiscal year-end cumulative deficit times that fiscal year's average effective Fed funds rate (FRED FEDFUNDS; the 3-month T-bill rate, TB3MS, before FY1955). It prices the whole stock of borrowing at the policy rate, so it moves with the Fed. FY1935–2025 in dollars, FY1940–2025 as a % of GDP.
- Actual outlays (FRED): federal interest actually paid (FRED FYOINT and FYOIGDA188S), FY1940–2025. That reflects the rates locked in when each bond was issued, so it lags the Fed. It appears to be gross interest, including interest credited to federal trust funds.
Each line is a least-squares fit from its start year through FY2025. Fit types and growth math are identical to the S&P page.
i
The same regression trend lines as the S&P 500 page, applied to the federal budget from the overspending side. Data: OMB Historical Table 1.1, fiscal years 1901–2025, nominal dollars. Fiscal years ended June 30 through 1976 and September 30 since 1977.
- Cumulative deficit (default): every deficit since 1789 added up, minus surpluses. It's a stock of borrowing that, like the index, compounds over time. It approximates debt held by the public ($27.5T at FY2025).
- Annual deficit: outlays minus receipts each year. It turns negative in surplus years, so only the Linear fit applies.
- Outlays / Receipts: total federal spending and revenue each year.
- Interest (% of GDP) / Interest payments: two measures, chosen with Interest measure:
- Total deficit × Fed rate (default): the prior fiscal year-end cumulative deficit times that fiscal year's average effective Fed funds rate (FRED FEDFUNDS; the 3-month T-bill rate, TB3MS, before FY1955). It prices the whole stock of borrowing at the policy rate, so it moves with the Fed. FY1935–2025 in dollars, FY1940–2025 as a % of GDP.
- Actual outlays (FRED): federal interest actually paid (FRED FYOINT and FYOIGDA188S), FY1940–2025. That reflects the rates locked in when each bond was issued, so it lags the Fed. It appears to be gross interest, including interest credited to federal trust funds.
Each line is a least-squares fit from its start year through FY2025. Fit types and growth math are identical to the S&P page.
Conclusions — interest burden vs. S&P 500 (FY1940–FY2025)
Interest here is the default measure: prior-year total (cumulative) deficit × the fiscal-year average Fed funds rate (3-month T-bill before FY1955).
- No statistical link to stock returns. Year-to-year changes in the interest burden are uncorrelated with S&P 500 returns at every lag from −2 to +2 years (r between −0.05 and +0.19, all p > 0.08). The burden level doesn't predict the next 10 years of S&P returns either (+0.13 pp/yr per 1 pp of GDP, p ≈ 0.9). The market hasn't priced the interest burden in any detectable way, under either measure.
- The burden follows the Fed. Priced at the policy rate, interest was 3.85% of GDP in FY1981 (Fed funds ~17%), fell to almost nothing in FY2009–2021 (0.05% in FY2014, 0.06% in FY2021), then jumped to a record 4.33% of GDP in FY2024 as rates reached 5.3% on a much larger debt. It eased to 3.68% in FY2025 as the Fed cut. Its long-run trend (+1.6%/yr since FY2000) is far below the S&P's, and the post-2010 trend (+33%/yr) is a rebound from near-zero rates, not a sustainable growth rate.
- Sustainability verdict: not sustainable on the current path, but the clock depends on the Fed. At the FY2025 Fed rate (4.4%), 4% nominal growth and a 1.8%-of-GDP primary deficit, r exceeds g by about 0.4 pp and debt reaches ~146% of GDP by 2050. Interest then crosses 5% of GDP around 2040 (≈ 30% of revenue around 2041) and 6% around 2050. If the Fed holds rates at 5.5%, that comes by about 2028; at 3.5% (below growth), not until the 2070s. On the interest ÷ revenue scale, this measure already touched the 25% "fiscal crisis risk" level in FY2024 (25.9%) before easing to about 22% in FY2025. On the status-quo path it re-enters 25%+ around 2032 (2026 if rates rise to 5.5%, about 2055 if they ease to 3.5%).
- What stabilizes it: with r this close to g, closing the primary deficit is enough. Interest levels off near 4.1% of GDP and debt near 100% through 2075. Faster growth (5%) pushes the 5% crossing out to about 2051.
Bottom line: interest costs and stock prices have moved independently, so the S&P chart offers no early warning. Measured as total debt × the Fed rate, the burden is already at a record, and on today's settings it becomes the dominant budget pressure in roughly 15–25 years (about 2040–2050). The range is 2028 to after 2070, set mostly by where the Fed holds rates.
Using actual interest outlays (FRED) instead
- No statistical link to stock returns. Year-to-year changes in interest as a % of GDP are uncorrelated with S&P 500 returns at every lag from −2 to +2 years (r between 0.00 and +0.16, all p > 0.14). The burden level doesn't significantly predict the next 10 years of S&P returns either (p ≈ 0.2, with a slightly positive sign). Historically the market hasn't priced the interest burden in any detectable way.
- The trends diverge sharply. Over the whole period, interest % of GDP grew about 1%/yr while the S&P compounded at about 7.5%/yr. Interest roughly tracked the economy until 2000 and actually fell from 1980 to 2000. Since FY2010, though, it has grown about +7.7%/yr faster than GDP (±2.3 pp), and since FY2000 about +3.4%/yr. That kind of acceleration can't continue indefinitely for a ratio to GDP.
- The burden is at a record. FY2025 interest is 3.94% of GDP and about 23% of revenue, above the 1991 peak of 3.16%.
- Sustainability verdict: not sustainable on the current path. With today's effective rate (~4.7%), nominal growth of ~4% and a primary deficit of ~1.8% of GDP, r > g and the debt ratio keeps rising (to ~155% of GDP by 2050). Interest crosses 5% of GDP around 2035 (≈ 30% of revenue) and 6% around 2043. The recent trend lines point sooner (5% by about 2029–2032), while easing rates (3.5%) push the 5% mark out to the 2070s. Rising rates (5.5%) bring it to about 2028. Interest is already about 23% of revenue (the "red flag" band above 20%) and crosses the 25% "fiscal crisis risk" level around 2028 on the status-quo path.
- What would stabilize it: only r ≤ g plus a small primary deficit, or a primary surplus while r > g. Closing the primary deficit to zero slows the climb a lot (4.3% of GDP in 2035, 4.8% in 2050, debt about 106%), but 5% still arrives around 2057. Faster growth alone (5%) delays the 5% crossing to about 2041.
Bottom line: interest costs and stock prices have moved independently, so the S&P chart offers no early warning. The arithmetic of debt does: unless rates fall below growth or the primary deficit closes, interest becomes the dominant budget pressure within roughly 10–20 years (mid-2030s to mid-2040s), with a realistic range of about 2028–2075 depending mainly on interest rates.
Earlier findings: cumulative deficit vs. S&P 500 (FY1928–FY2025)
- Same long-run trend rate. Fit from 1929, 1950, 1970 or 1990, the cumulative deficit and the S&P 500 both compound at roughly 7–8% a year, and the gap is statistically indistinguishable from zero (p ≈ 0.4–0.97). Both are nominal-dollar series driven largely by nominal GDP growth (real growth plus inflation), so this is a shared driver, not evidence that one causes the other.
- Since 2000 they diverge. From FY2000 the cumulative deficit's trend (~9.5%/yr) has outpaced the S&P's (~7.4%/yr) by about 2 pp a year. That difference is significant at the 5% level (p ≈ 0.03), though 26 years is a short sample for a volatile index.
- The high levels correlation (r ≈ 0.96) is mostly spurious. The Durbin-Watson statistic (≈ 0.2) shows the residuals are highly persistent, the classic sign of two trending series that would correlate regardless of any link. Cointegration is borderline: significant only at the 10% level, so the evidence for a stable long-run relationship is weak.
- Year-to-year movements are essentially unrelated. Same-year growth rates are uncorrelated (r ≈ +0.09, p ≈ 0.4). Small lead/lag correlations appear (deficit growth tends to follow weak markets and precede strong ones), with individual p ≈ 0.02–0.03, but none survive a correction for testing five lags.
- The shapes differ. The S&P's log-quadratic curvature is significant (its trend growth rate has risen over the century), while the cumulative deficit's is not (steady compounding with wartime and crisis bursts).
Bottom line: the two charts look alike because both compound with the nominal economy, at nearly the same long-run rate. There's no statistically robust evidence that deficits and stock returns move together year to year. The one significant divergence is the post-2000 period, when borrowing has grown faster than the market. Choose another series above to rerun the tests live.